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Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members
have prepared economic forecasts twice per year since
1979, as required by law.1 These FOMC forecasts receive
a great deal of attention, although neither individual
member forecasts nor the mean or median forecasts are
revealed. Instead, only ranges (minimum and maximum)
are reported. The economy’s future is always uncertain,
and a wider forecast range reflects greater disagreement
among the policymakers about the future. However, even
if the forecasts of all the policymakers were identical
(perfect consensus), they would likely be wrong because
the future is inherently unpredictable. The table below
attempts to gauge the degree of consensus about the out-
look, relative to the economy’s inherent unpredictability. 
Forecasts are made of annual, fourth-quarter-over-
fourth-quarter growth rates for nominal gross domestic
product (GDP), real GDP, and inflation. Fed policymakers
also forecast the unemployment rate for the fourth quarter
of the year. February forecasts pertain to the current calen-
dar year (referred to in the table as the 12-month forecasts).
In July, forecasts are updated for the current calendar year
(6-month forecasts) and preliminary projections are made
for the next calendar year (18-month forecasts).
We define the FOMC consensus forecast as the mid-
point of the range between the high and low forecasts.
The table shows the root-mean-squared error (RMSE) of
the consensus forecasts, one-half the width of the forecast
ranges, and their ratio. (We use one-half the range to make
the scale comparable to the RMSE, which is an index of
unpredictability.) The width of the range is an inverse
measure of consensus; as such, the ratios reveal, in a simple
way, the degree of consensus among the policymakers
about the outlook for a variable relative to the difficulty
of predicting that variable. A high ratio, for example,
indicates a strong consensus regarding the outlook, relative
to the unpredictability of the variable.
In every case the RMSE is larger than half the width
of the range. Paradoxically, the highest figures (where the
consensus is strong relative to the degree of predictability)
are for “real” variables such as GDP and the unemploy-
ment rate, over which the Fed has little control. At the same
time, the smallest figures are observed for inflation, over
which the Fed is widely regarded as having considerable
influence. Among inflation forecast horizons, the least
amount of consensus emerges for the longest horizon—
18 months—where the Fed’s control presumably is the
strongest.
The figures reveal a wide difference of opinion among
FOMC members regarding the medium-term outlook for
inflation, relative to the underlying predictability of infla-
tion. This may explain, in part, the FOMC’s reluctance to
publicly commit to an inflation target. 
—William T. Gavin
1The reporting requirement of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act expired in May 2000,
but the Congress amended and continued the reporting requirements in the
American Homeownership and Economic Opportunity Act of 2000 (Section 1003).




RMSE (percent annual rate) 1.27 1.35 1.59
One-half width of range 0.62 0.81 0.85
Ratio 2.05 1.67 1.87
Inflation
RMSE (percent annual rate) 0.59 0.97 1.12
One-half width of range 0.51 0.70 0.99
Ratio 1.18 1.38 1.13
Unemployment
RMSE (percent annual rate) 0.55 0.68 0.97
One-half width of range 0.30 0.35 0.48
Ratio 1.86 1.96 2.01